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I. Introduction
Multilateral trade is rife with complaints about trade
distortions occasioned by the massive agricultural support that rich
countries provide to domestic producers, with disastrous
consequences for the economies of developing countries.' A
prominent example of such a system of support is the European
Union (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under which
incentives are provided to European farmers to increase
agricultural productivity' through price supports,' export subsidies,
I See Sub-Committee on Cotton, Proposed Elements of Modalities in Connection
with the Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, Communication from the African Group,
4, TN/AG/SCC/GEN/2 (Apr. 22, 2005), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/tn/ag/sccgen2.doc
[hereinafter Communication from the African Group] (noting, in a WTO communication
document, that certain WTO members' cotton subsidies negatively affects most
significantly Africa's least developed cotton-trading countries).
2 The EU's CAP was created under the 1957 Rome Treaty with the primary
objectives of "increas[ing] agricultural productivity," "ensur[ing] a fair standard of living
for farmers," "stabilis[ing] markets," "assur[ing] the availability of supplies," and
"ensur[ing] reasonable prices for consumers." The Treaty of Rome and the Foundations
of the Common Agricultural Policy, part B (Mar. 2011), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU 4.2.1.pdf. For useful analyses of the EU
Common Agricultural Policy, see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EcoN. RESEARCH SERV., THE
EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: PRESSURES FOR CHANGE WRS-99-
2 (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter PRESSURES FOR CHANGE]; INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY,
THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION (Sept. 2007); JEAN-
CHRISTOPHE BUREAU, ENLARGEMENT AND REFORM OF THE EU COMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY: IMPACTS ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES § 5.6 (Sept. 17, 2002),
available at http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/mktacc/Bureau.pdf, U. S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., EUROPEAN UNION: COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, BRIEFING
RooM [hereinafter BRIEFING RooM], available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/
intemational-markets-trade/countries-regions/european-union/common-agricultural-
policy.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); Anja Helk, Beginner's Guide to EU Common
Agricultural Policy, TOBACCO J. INT'L, July 5, 2010,
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export credits, direct payments to farmers,4 supply controls,' and
border measures.6 About 55 billionE are spent on the CAP each
year.' The CAP budget for 2010 was 43.8 billionE, which was
31% of the EU budget and up 6.4% from the previous year.'
Underscoring its significance, the CAP has, over the last forty
http://www.tobaccojournal.com/Beginner s_guide to EUCommonAgricultural Polic
y.50122.0.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Beginner's Guide].
3 Guaranteed intervention prices are maintained for major commodities such as
some grains, dairy products, beef and veal, and sugar. See PRESSURES FOR CHANGE,
supra note 2, at 13. There are also subsidies provided to assist with surplus storage and
consumer subsidies to encourage domestic consumption of products like butter and
skimmed milk powder. See id at 12.
4 As another category of support, decoupled or direct payments are made to
farmers based on the average level of payments made during a reference year, and no
production is required. See BRIEFING RooM, supra note 2, 12. Under the 2003
reforms, "in the livestock sector, headage payments (payments per animal) are made in
the beef and sheep sectors based on 2000-02 average payments, with no production
required." Id.
5 Until 2008, mandatory, paid, set-aside programs were utilized as supply controls
to limit production. Id. T 13. "To be eligible for compensation payments in the 1992
reform, producers of grains, oilseeds, or protein crops had to remove a specified
percentage of their area from production." Id. The 2000 reforms "set the base rate for
the required set-aside for arable crops at 10 percent. Producers with an area planted with
these crops sufficient to produce no more than 92 metric tons of grain [were] classified
as small producers and [were] exempt from the set-aside requirement." Id Although no
longer used, set-asides could be reinstated to combat conditions of oversupply in the
future. See id
6 "In preferential trade agreements ... the EU satisfies domestic consumer
demand while protecting high domestic prices through import quotas and minimum
import price requirements. The CAP also applies tariffs at EU borders so that imports
cannot be sold domestically below the internal market prices (intervention prices) set by
the CAP." Id. 13. Moreover, export subsidies are provided for bulk commodities to
enable the EU to remain competitive in world markets. Id. T 14. Even "EU exports of
processed products that contain a portion of a CAP-supported commodity also receive an
export subsidy, based on the proportion of the commodity in the product and the
difference between the average cost of the raw material and the world price." Id. For
more explanation of the CAP, see ALAN MATTHEWS, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE AND DEV.,
How MIGHT THE EU's COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AFFECT TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT AFTER 2013? (Dec. 2010); Beginner's Guide, supra note 2.
7 EU Domestic Supports and Policy Tools Protecting European Farmers:
Implications for the EPA Negotiations, GDC-Partners 1 (Aug. 2010) [hereinafter GDC-
Partners].
8 Common Agricultural Policy, CIVITAS EU FACTS,
http://civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSPOL/AG3.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) [hereinafter
CIVITAS, Agricultural Policy].
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years, "brought about a massive reversal in the agricultural trading
position of the EU, transforming the world's largest importer of
temperate-zone agricultural products into the world's second-
largest exporter of food and agricultural products."9 Globally, rich
countries now subsidize agriculture at a combined total of $1
billion a day.10
However, agricultural subsidies cause distortions in world
trade by stimulating overproduction, which in turn frequently
yields depressive effects on world market prices as subsidizing
countries export their surpluses at lower prices." The
governments of developing countries generally cannot afford to
pay export subsidies, and thus lose some of their export
competitiveness relative to developed countries.12  Even more
damaging, subsidies enable agricultural exports from rich
countries to drive small farmers out of business even in their home
countries"-a development that could threaten domestic food
securityl4 as well as undermine export potential."
The European Union has been negotiating with African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP countries) to replace the
existing trade agreement between the parties, the Cotonou
Agreement, 6 with new ones known as Economic Partnership
9 PRESSURES FOR CHANGE, supra note 2, at 5.
10 Carl Bildt, Diversionary Tactics: Want to Help Africa? Stop Farm Subsidies,
WALL ST. J. EUR., June 18, 2002.
1 See BUREAU, supra note 2, § 5.6.
12 RALF PETERS, ROADBLOCK TO REFORM: THE PERSISTENCE OF AGRICULTURAL
EXPORT SUBSIDIES, at 32, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/33, U.N. Sales No.
E.05.II.D.18 (2006).
13 AUDRE BICIUNAITE, CRITICAL APPROACH OF EU's COMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY: BASED ON LIBERAL VIEWS OF MURRAY N. ROTHBARD 6 (2008),
http://www.1rinka.It/uploads/files/dir30/dirl/4_0.php.
14 See OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, FOOD AID OR HIDDEN DUMPING? SEPARATING
WHEAT FROM CHAFF 17 (2005), available at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp7 _food-aid.pdf.
15 See id. at 15.
16 Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean, and
Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member
States, of the Other Part, signed in Contonou on 23 June 2000, 2000/483/EC,
http://europa.eu/legislation-summaries/development/african-caribbeanjpacific-states/rl
2101 en.htm [hereinafter Cotonou Agreement].
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Agreements (EPAs).17 The objective of the EPAs, to establish free
trade areas between ACP countries and the European Union,
warrants liberalizing trade by eliminating tariffs and most non-
tariff barriers affecting ACP-EU trade." Because the EU CAP
adversely impacts the competitiveness of ACP producers, in both
ACP countries and EU markets,19 it constitutes a significant trade
barrier to ACP-EU trade.20 Thus, the CAP is relevant to the trade
liberalization objective of the EPAs21 and the implications of the
trade policy fall within the scope of the EPAs negotiations.
Accordingly, the negotiations provide an opportunity for the ACP
countries to address the perceived restrictions on access to the EU
market and other trade distortions caused by the EU CAP policy.
This article examines the international rules on subsidies in
order to identify remedial measures that could be included in
EPAs to mitigate the adverse consequences of EU support
programs. As background, Section I describes the trade-distorting
effects of subsidies, as illustrated by the West African cotton
sector. Section II examines the World Trade Organization (WTO)
regulatory framework on subsidies and assesses the status of WTO
support reduction talks, including the Cotton Initiative. Section III
explains the relevance of subsidies to the trade liberalisation
objective of the EPAs and notes difficulties with reaching a
compromise. Section IV proposes interim measures to be
explored in the EPAs, including increased transparency in the
application of WTO rules, preservation of adequate policy space
for ACP countries, and payment of transitional compensation for
17 The EPAs are essentially trade agreements that envisage the creation of free
trade areas between the EU and ACP Countries. See id. art. 36.
18 See infra notes 270-272 and accompanying text.
19 GDC-Partners, supra note 7, at 1.
20 The CAP has been described as "a form of protectionism designed to defend
European producers from cheaper products outside the EU." CIVITAS, Agricultural
Policy, supra note 8, para. 6.
21 As Oxfam describes it, "the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) depresses and
destabilises markets for non-subsidising exporters, including those in the developing
world. The continued practice of dumping-exporting at prices far below the costs of
production-is destroying domestic markets in developing countries." OXFAM
INTERNATIONAL, STOP THE DUMPING! How EU AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ARE
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harms caused by the EU support regime.
II. The Impact of Subsidies
A. Trade-Distorting Effects of Subsidies
The term "subsidy" is described by the WTO as "a financial
contribution by a government or any public body within the
territory of a Member... where ... a benefit is thereby
conferred."2 2 Measures that represent financial contributions in
this sense include grants, loans, equity infusions, loan guarantees,
fiscal incentives, and the provision of goods or services. 2 3
Specifically extending such benefits to some producers and not to
others is considered problematic under trade rules, as they could
distort the allocation of resources within the economy.24 The
trade-distorting effects of subsidies include overproduction,
artificial competitiveness of subsidized commodities in domestic
and external markets, and global price suppression with adverse
revenue implications for the non-subsidizing countries.
In general, countries embark on subsidy programs to boost
domestic production and attain self-sufficiency, thereby yielding a
reduction of imports.2 5 Subsidies reduce the producer's costs,
which lead to more commodities being produced than an efficient
marketplace would have allowed without the distortive subsidies.2 6
However, even after attaining self-sufficiency, the stimulus from
the support price in question continues to encourage production,
leading to a situation where domestic supply exceeds domestic
22 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
2 3 Id.
24 As the WTO explains, "The basic principle is that a subsidy that distorts the
allocation of resources within an economy should be subject to discipline. Where a
subsidy is widely available within an economy, such a distortion in the allocation is
presumed to occur." Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Overview, World Trade
Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/scme/subs-e.htm (last visited Oct.
30, 2012).
25 See Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Multilateral Trade Negotiations on
Agriculture - A Resource Manual/Agreement on Agriculture: Export Subsidies, module
3, http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7353e/x7353e03.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
26 See RAMBOD BEHBOODI, INDUSTRIAL SUBSIDIES AND FRICTION IN WORLD TRADE:
TRADE POLICY OR TRADE POLITICS 11 (1994).
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demand. 27 The surplus 28 must be directed somewhere, and is often
directed towards--or dumped within 2 9-external markets,30
effectively transforming a subsidizing country from a former
importer into a net exporter. The release of the commodity into
the global market then sets off a chain of events that have
implications for international trade, including the distortion of
other countries' economies.3'
For example, releasing a subsidized commodity into the global
market affects the world price of the commodity.3 2 Where the
demand for the commodity in the world market is steady or
falling, the increase in the global supply brought on by subsidies
can lead to a fall in the world price." Even if the price remains the
same, the subsidized exports can have price-suppressive effects
where the increase in global supply prevents the price of the
commodity from rising naturally in a market of steady demand and
declining supplies.
Subsidies also protect firms in subsidizing countries from
international competition.3 4 Since subsidies artificially lower the
cost of production,35 subsidized firms can afford to keep domestic
prices at levels much lower than foreign competition. Foreign
competitors, on the other hand, lacking support from their own
governments which are unable to provide export subsidies,3 6
cannot afford to sell the goods they export to the subsidizing
27 See Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., The Effects of Subsidies and Market
Restrictions on Agriculture and Fisheries Production and Market Access, 39, LARC
02/04 (2002), http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/004/y6068e.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2012) [hereinafter FAO Effects of Subsidies].
28 PETERS, supra note 12, at 1.
29 For example, in 2003, subsidized cotton was exported at an average of 47%
below the cost of production. See SOPHIA MURPHY ET AL., INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE
POLICY, WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: A DECADE OF DUMPING 2 (Feb. 2005),
http://www.iatp.org/files/451_2_48532.pdf.
30 FAO Effects of Subsidies, supra note 27, 39.
31 See BEHBOODI, supra note 26, at 11.
32 See Trade Policy Brief, Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Cotton: Impact of
Support Policies on Developing Countries, para. 1 (2004), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/
007/y5533e/y5533e00.pdf [hereinafter FAO Trade Policy Brief].
33 Id.
34 See BEHBOODI, supra note 26, at 12.
35 See id at 11.
36 PETERS, supra note 12, at 2.
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country at prices that are lower than their costs of production. As
a result, the higher-priced exports to the subsidizing country will
no longer be competitive, thereby impeding the foreign
competitors' access to the subsidizing country's market.37
Therefore, an effect of subsidies will be the substitution of
domestic products for imported goods in the subsidizing country.38
Conversely, artificially lowered costs of production allow
subsidizing countries' firms to market their goods in non-
subsidizing countries at prices well below those of local
competitors. In this way, subsidy programs encourage dumping of
the subsidized exports.39 Local producers in non-subsidizing
countries would not be able to match lower-priced imports and
would therefore no longer be competitive, even though they may
be far more efficient in production than their foreign
counterparts. 40  Faced with declining sales and/or low market
prices, local farmers may eventually be forced to reduce
production or even abandon production altogether.
For individual producers in the non-subsidizing country,
declining sales, low- prices, or business closings result in a
reduction or loss of income to local farmers whose products
cannot compete with the cheap subsidized imports.4 1 Where the
relevant commodities constitute the main sources of livelihood of
the population, the loss of income can lead to poverty and have a
devastating impact on the economic and social lives of the
population.42 On a broader national level, the country whose
production has been supplanted by cheap subsidized imports
37 See FAO Effects of Subsidies, supra note 27, 140.
38 See BEHBOODI, supra note 26, at 12.
39 See Briefing Note, Oxfam International, An End to EU Sugar Dumping?
Implications of the WTO Panel Ruling in the Dispute against EU Sugar Policies Brought
by Brazil, Thailand, and Australia (Aug. 6, 2004),
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/dumping0.pdf.
40 Subsidies distort the economy of the non-subsidizing country when "the lower
costs of subsidised products cause a misallocation of output between the foreign and
domestic markets, whereby resources are diverted to less efficient producers" leading to
an expansion of exports. BEHBOODI, supra note 26, at 11.
41 See, e.g., FAO Effects of Subsidies, supra note 27, 42 (explaining that
subsidies sometimes lead to more efficient producers supplanting local producers).
42 See OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, FINDING THfE MORAL FIBER: WHY REFORM IS
URGENTLY NEEDED FOR A FAIR COTTON TRADE 5 (2004) [hereinafter OXFAM, FINDING
MORAL FIBER], available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/files/cotton-briefl01804.pdf.
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would no longer receive income from this production when local
firms go out of business. Further, the government would be
unable to generate export income from viable companies that are
unable to gain access to international markets. Even for firms that
could compete and export their products, the depressed global
market prices caused by the subsidies would further reduce the
country's revenue potential. Budgetary constraints created by
constricting export revenues would limit the government's ability
both to mobilize resources for sustainable development and to
adopt policies to boost economic growth, reduce poverty, and
promote greater social equity.4
B. Examples from the African Cotton Sector
The trade-distorting effects of subsidies can be illustrated with
reference to the cotton sector, on which there is a high level of
dependence by a number of African countries." In Africa, cotton
is typically a smallholder crop, often the main cash crop,45 and is
grown in rainfed land with minimal use of purchased inputs, such
as chemicals and fertilizers.46 Thirty-three African countries are
producers and net exporters of cotton.47 In the West and Central
African (WCA) countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali
(the Cotton Four), over 90% of the cotton produced is for export.4 8
Furthermore, cotton dominates these countries' exports,
representing approximately 30% of total export earnings and over
60% of earnings from agricultural exports.4 9
Collectively, the WCA countries are the seventh-largest global
43 See FAO Effects of Subsidies, supra note 27, 41.
44 See John Baffes, The "Cotton Problem" 1 (2004), http://www.fao.org/es/ESC/
common/ecg/306/en/CottonProblemBaffes.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) [hereinafter
The "Cotton Problem"].
45 John Baffes, Cotton and Developing Countries: A Case Study in Policy
Coherence, at 1, THE WORLD BANK GROUP (Sept. 10, 2003), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/04/19/000090341 20050
419151909/Rendered/PDF/32096OTradeNotelO.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2012)
[hereinafter Baffes, Cotton and Developing Countries].
46 The "Cotton Problem," supra note 44, at 1.
47 Communication from the African Group, supra note 1, 1.1.
48 See Kevin C. Kennedy, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural
Subsidies, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335, 338 (2008).
49 Communication from the African Group, supra note 1, T 2.1.
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producer of cottonso with approximately 15% of the share of
global exports." While cotton plays a relatively minor role in the
economies of developed countries,52 it is a critical sector in the
WCA countries. Indeed, "the cotton growing and processing
sector currently provides the only real option for access to cash
income and employment for an estimated 10 million poor people
in rural areas." 4 Incomes and wages, in turn, "stimulate local
demand and markets, and pay for education and health care for
their families, and tools and inputs for cultivation."" Furthermore,
revenues from cotton exports make it possible for governments to
improve the physical and social infrastructure in cotton-producing
regions," which could include roads, schools, and health centers.
Cotton therefore occupies a strategic position in the development
policies and poverty reduction programs of those countries.
Although the WCA countries are low-cost producers of cotton,
with costs of production less than half of those of their
competition," this comparative advantage has been eroded by the
trade-distorting effects of massive subsidization provided by other
countries. In one year alone, assistance to U.S. cotton producers
reached $3.6 billion, China's totaled $1.2 billion, while the
European Union provided almost $1 billion." During the same
50 Kennedy, supra note 48, at 338. "The world's four largest producing and
consuming countries are China, the United States, India, and Pakistan, with the United
States, China, and India together providing over half the world's cotton." Id. at 336.
51 Id. at 338. The United States accounts for 40% of global trade in raw cotton,
with 70% of cotton grown in the United States destined for export. Id. at 337.
52 In the U.S., for example, "[c]otton production accounts for just over three-
hundredths of a percent (0.034%) of U.S. GDP (2002). Cotton accounts for 1.4% of total
merchandise exports and 4% of agricultural exports." CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS21712, THE AFRICAN COTTON INITIATIVE AND WTO AGRICULTURE
NEGOTIATIONS 2 (2004) [hereinafter AFRICAN COTTON INITIATIVE].
53 See Communication from the African Group, supra note 1, 2.
54 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, 'WHITE GOLD' TURNS TO DUST: WHICH WAY FORWARD
FOR COTTON IN WEST AFRICA? 4 (2004), [hereinafter OXFAM, WHITE GOLD] available at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/gold.pdf
55 Id
56 See OXFAM, FINDING MORAL FIBER, supra note 42, at 5.
57 In 2001, the average cost of production in Benin was 31 cents per pound
compared to 68 cents per pound in the United States. AFRICAN COTTON INITIATIVE,
supra note 52, at 3.
58 The "Cotton Problem," supra note 44, at 4.
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period, producers in Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, and Turkey received a
combined total of $110 million, while India also supported its
cotton sector by an estimated $500 million."
Increased subsidies have been linked to lower global prices, as
exemplified by the finding of a WTO dispute settlement panel in
2003 that U.S. cotton subsidies had price-suppressive effects.60
One researcher has determined that the elimination of U.S. cotton
subsidies between 2003 and 2007 would have increased world
prices by about 10%," while other studies have shown impacts as
high as 30%62 or as low as 2-3%.63 Going with a simple average
over all models, the annual income loss to WCA countries from
exports as a result of subsidies provided during the period covered
by the surveys is estimated at approximately $150 million,' while
the International Cotton Advisory Committee has put the revenue
loss at $250 million for the same period." In some cases, the
income loss exceeded-and thereby negated-the values of
Western aid to those countries.6 6 Indeed, it has been observed that
59 Id.
60 Panel Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, at
307 (Sept. 8, 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/267r-a-e.pdf
[hereinafter Upland Cotton]. For analyses of the case, see RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS22187, U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESPONSE TO WTO CoTTON
DECISION 6 (2006); William Hett, Note, U.S. Corn and Soybean Subsidies: WTO
Litigation and Sustainable Protections, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 775
(2011); Scott D. Andersen & Meredith A. Taylor, Brazil's WTO Challenge to U.S.
Cotton Subsidies, BUS. L. BRIEF 2 (2009-2010).
61 DANIEL A. SUMNER, A QUANTITATIVE SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF
US COTTON SUBSIDIES ON COTTON PRICES AND QUANTITIES 310 (2003), available at
www.fao.org/ES/esc/common/ecg/306/en/Sumner.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2012)
(unpublished paper).
62 The International Cotton Advisory Committee came to the conclusion based on
a study of cotton prices in the 2000-01 cotton season. See The "Cotton Problem," supra
note 44, at 8.
63 A number of factors affect these findings, including the base year used for
counting U.S. payments, which are often linked to prices and rise when prices fall, and to
production in other countries. See FAO Trade Policy Brief, supra note 32, at 2-3.
64 See The "Cotton Problem," supra note 44, at 9.
65 The model used by the International Cotton Advisory Committee assumes an 11
cent per pound increase in the world price of cotton as reported in 2001-02. See
AFRICAN COTTON INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 4.
66 In 2002, while Burkina Faso received $10 million in U.S. aid, it lost $13.7
million in export earnings. Togo received $4 million in U.S. aid, but lost $7.4 million in
export earnings. OXFAM, FINDING MORAL FIBER, supra note 42, at 1.
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"the elimination of the measures and policies that distort the
international cotton trade would help to promote cotton production
and trade in the African countries, particularly in the least
developed among them, thereby acting as an important catalyst for
poverty reduction in the countries concerned."67 Specifically,
removal of support would "reduce production [in the subsidizing
countries] and consequently boost prices, allowing third world
farmers to compete to earn profit on their crops."6 8
III. Regulation of Subsidies by the World Trade Organization
There are two basic agreements addressing the regulation of
subsidies by the WTO: the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM),6 9 which applies to all subsidies;
and the Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), 70 which applies only
to agricultural subsidies.
A. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
1. Financial Contributions and Specificity
Under the SCM, a subsidy exists if "there is a financial
contribution by a government or any public body within the
territory of a Member"" and "a benefit is thereby conferred."72
The agreement provides illustrations of the term "financial
contribution," such as where "a government practice involves a
direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, and equity infusion),
potential direct transfers of funds[,] or liabilities (e.g. loan
guarantees)"" or where "government revenue that is otherwise due
is foregone or not collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax
67 Communication from the African Group, supra note 1, 7.
68 Baffes, Cotton and Developing Countries, supra note 45, at 1.
69 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex IA, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14
[hereinafter Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures].
70 Agreement on Agriculture, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round
Annex lA, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on
Agriculture].
71 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 69, art.
1.1(a)(1).
72 Id. at art. 1.1(b).
73 Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(i).
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credits)[,]" 74 or the "government provides goods or services other
than general infrastructure or purchases goods."" A financial
contribution is also deemed to be made where "a government
makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a
private body to carry out one or more of the.. . [preceding]
functions. . . which would normally be vested in the government
and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally
followed by governments."7 6 In addition to financial contributions
as illustrated in the Agreement, a subsidy also includes "any form
of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT
1994"" and "a benefit is thereby conferred."
However, to come within the scope of the SCM, a subsidy
must be specific to an enterprise or industry or group of
enterprises or industries." Specificity is established where "the
granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the
granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to
certain enterprises."" Specificity does not exist where "the
granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the
granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or
conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a
subsidy .. . provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such
criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to."" In such a case,
the "criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law,
regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of
verification."82
Subsidies which fall within the scope of the SCM are divided
into three categories: prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable;
they are often referred to in the literature by the colors used for
traffic lights such as red (forbidden), amber (slow down) and
74 Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii).
75 Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii).
76 Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv).
77 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 69, art.
1.1 (a)(2) (addressing subsidies on exports of primary products).
78 Id. at art. 1.1(b).
79 See id. at art. 1.2.
80 Id. at art. 2.1(a).
81 Id. at art. 2.1(b).
82 Id.
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green (permitted), respectively.
2. Prohibited Subsidies
Prohibited subsidies are subsidies contingent upon export
performance,8 or "the use of domestic over imported goods." 5
These subsidies are presumed to be specific86 and hence not
subject to evidentiary proof of specificity."
Annex I of the SCM provides an illustrative list of export
subsidies including: (a) direct subsidies to an enterprise based on
export performance;" (b) "[c]urrency retention schemes . . . which
involve a bonus on export;"8 (c) government-mandated "[i]nternal
transport and freight charges on export shipments" that are more
favorable than for domestic shipments;90 (d) provision of goods
and services for production of exports on terms more favorable
than "those commercially available;"9 1 (e) tax breaks for export
enterprises;9 2 (f) tax deductions directly and indirectly related to
exports above those given to products consumed domestically;93
(g) export credits,9 4 and "export credit guarantee[s] or insurance
programs."9 5 Examples of import substitution subsidies include
83 See Domestic Support in Agriculture: The Boxes, World Trade Organization
(October 1, 2002), http://wto.org/english/tratop e/agric e/agboxes_e.htm [hereinafter
WTO Fact Sheet].
84 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 69, art.
3.1(a).
85 Id. at art. 3.1(b).
86 See id. at art. 2.3.
87 See generally id. at art. 2.4 ("Any determination of specificity under the
provisions of this Article shall be clearly substantiated on the basis of positive
evidence.").
88 Id. Annex I(a).
89 Id. Annex I(b).
90 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 69, Annex
I(c).
91 Id. Annex I(d).
92 Id. Annex 1(e).
93 Id. Annex 1(f-h).
94 Id. Annex 1(k).
95 Export credit guarantee or insurance programs are prohibited where they insure
or provide guarantees "against increases in the cost of exported products or of exchange
risk programmes, at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term
operating costs and losses of the programmes." Id. Annex 1(j).
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local content subsidies such as grants of preferences for use of
domestic rather than imported products.96
3. Actionable Subsidies
An actionable subsidy is one that meets the general definition
of a subsidy and has adverse effects on other members of the
WTO.97 Such adverse effects could be shown through proof of (i)
"injury to the domestic industry of another Member;"98 or (ii)
"nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or
indirectly to other Members;" 99 or (iii) "serious prejudice to the
interests of another Member.""oo
To determine injury to a domestic industry, an investigation
looks into the "volume of the allegedly subsidized imports, the
effects of these imports on prices of the like product in the
domestic market and the consequent impact of the imports on the
domestic industry."o' Nullification or impairment occurs when
the effect of a member's subsidized goods alter the market and
undercut the market access of another member.10 2
Serious prejudice is presumed to exist if a subsidy is more than
five percent of the value of the product, covers operating losses of
an industry or an enterprise,0 3 or constitutes "direct forgiveness of
debt," including "forgiveness of government held debt, and grants
96 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 69,
Annex III(I-II).
97 See id. at art. 5.
98 Id. at art. 5(a).
99 Id. at art. 5(b).
100 Id. at art. 5(c).
101 Id at art. 11.2(iv). Generally, the SCM requires "evidence that alleged injury to
a domestic industry is caused by subsidized imports through the effects of the subsidies."
Id. Such evidence can be established through "information on the evolution of the
volume of the allegedly subsidized imports, the effect of these imports on prices of the
like product in the domestic market and the consequent impact of the imports on the
domestic industry, as demonstrated by relevant factors and indices having a bearing on
the state of the domestic industry." Id.
102 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 69, at art.
6. The SCM notes that the term "nullification or impairment" is used in the same sense
it is used in Article XXIII of GATT 1994. See id at art. 5, n.12.
103 The SCM exempts a subsidy considered to be a "one-time measure[] which [is]
non-recurrent and ... given merely to provide time for the development of long-term
solutions and to avoid acute social problems." See id. at art. 6.1(c).
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to cover debt repayment."10 4 Serious prejudice can be established
through proof that the effect of the subsidy is
(a) to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another
Member into the market of the subsidizing Member;
(b) to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another
Member from a third country market;105
(c) a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as
compared with the price of a like product of another Member in
the same market or significant price suppression, price
depression or lost sales in the same market;106 or
(d) an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing
Member in a particular subsidized primary product or
commodity as compared to the average share it had during the
previous period of three years and this increase follows a
consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been
granted. 107
Factors that may preclude a finding of displacement include
export restrictions imposed by the complaining Member; failure to
conform to standards and other regulatory requirements in the
importing country;' or occurrence of natural disasters, strikes,
transport disruptions or other force majeure substantially affecting
production, qualities, quantities or prices of the product available
104 Id. at art. 6.1.
105 Displacement or impeding of exports can be established by proof of "a change
in relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product
(over an appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in the
development of the market for the product concerned, which, in normal circumstances,
shall be at least one year)." Id. at art. 6.4. Evidence of such "change in relative shares of
the market" may include: (a) an "increase in the market share of the subsidized product;
(b) the market share of the subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in
which, in the absence of the subsidy, it would have declined; and (c) the market share of
the subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been the case in the
absence of the subsidy." Id.
106 The comparison of "prices of the subsidized products with prices of non-
subsidized like product supplied to the same market" is to be made "at the same level of
trade and at comparable times, due account being taken of any other factor affecting
price comparability. However, if such a direct comparison is not possible, the existence
of price undercutting may be demonstrated on the basis of export unit values." Id. at art.
6.5
107 Id. at art. 6.3.
108 Id. at art. 6.7.
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for export from the complaining Member.o
4. Non-Actionable Subsidies
Non-actionable subsidies are subsidies which are either not
specific or meet the criteria for exemption under the SCM."o
Subsidies classified as non-actionable include: (a) assistance for
research activities conducted by firms or by higher education or
research establishments on a contract basis with firms;"' (b)
assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a
Member given pursuant to a general framework of regional
development;" 2 and (c) assistance to promote adaptation of
existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by
law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and
financial burden on firms." 3
B. The Agreement on Agriculture
1. Export Subsidies
Similar to the SCM, the URAA distinguishes between export
subsidies and domestic support.1 4  The URAA defines exports
subsidies as subsidies contingent upon export."' They are
identified in the Agreement to include: (a) direct subsidies to
109 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 69, at art.
6.7.
110 Id.atart.8.1.
111 To be non-actionable, the assistance for research activities must cover not more
than 75% of the costs of industrial research or 50% of the costs of "pre-competitive
development activity." Id. at art. 8.2(a).
112 A determination that a region is disadvantaged can be made only "on the basis
of neutral and objective criteria, indicating that the region's difficulties arise out of more
than temporary circumstances; such criteria must be clearly spelled out in law,
regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification." Id. at art.
8.2(b).
113 However, to be non-actionable, the assistance must be a "one-time non-
recurring measure ... limited to 20% of the cost of adaptation ... not cover the cost of
replacing and operating the assisted investment . . . and . . . directly linked to and
proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisances and pollution." Id. at art. 8.2(c).
114 See generally Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70 (discussing Article 6
and its domestic support commitments and Article 9, which addresses export subsidies).
115 See id. at art. 1(e).
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farmers;l 6 (b) sale of goods for export at prices lower than those at
which the goods are sold in the domestic market;"' (c) payments
based on exports;"' (d) payments to reduce the costs of marketing
exports;"' (e) preferential internal and freight charges on export
shipments;'2 0 and (f) subsidies on agricultural products that are
incorporated in exported goods.' 2 '
In marked contrast to the SCM, the URAA does not deem any
export subsidies to be per se illegal. 2 2 Instead, it subjects export
subsidies to limits on both value and quantity of products to be
subsidized.123  Under the URAA, developed countries are
obligated over a six-year period to cut export subsidies 36% by
value and 21% by quantity.124  For the developing countries, the
cuts are 24% and 14%, respectively,125 but over a ten year period
in recognition of the principle of special and differential
treatment.12 6  No export subsidy reduction obligations were
imposed on the least developed countries, as most do not have the
resources to significantly subsidize exports.12 7
2. Domestic Support Subsidies
The URAA limits domestic subsidies to differing degrees,
depending on how much a subsidy distorts production and trade.
While the SCM takes a definitional approach to subsidies,
distinguishing between prohibited export-related and actionable
116 See id. at art. 9(a).
117 See id. at art. 9(b).
118 See id. at art. 9(c).
119 Under Article 9(d), an export subsidy includes "the provision of subsidies to
reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products (other than widely
available export promotion and advisory services) including handling, upgrading and
other processing costs, and the costs of international transport and freight." Id. at art.
9(d).
120 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at art. 9(e).
121 See id. at art. 9(f).
122 See generally id. at art. 3 (limiting subsidization to levels specified by
Members).
123 See id at art. 3.3.
124 See id. at art. 9.2(b)(iv).
125 See id.
126 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, art. 15.
127 See id.
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domestic subsidies, the URAA uses an effects approach.'2 8 It
examines the total trade-distorting effect of a subsidy and caps the
most damaging.129 The URAA distinguishes among highly trade-
distorting subsidies,' minimally trade-distorting subsidies,"' and
non-trade-distorting subsidies,' known respectively by their
vernacular names as Amber Box, Blue Box, and Green Box
subsidies.'
a. Amber Box Subsidies
Amber Box subsidies are any domestic support measures in
favor of agricultural producers that do not fall under either the
Blue or Green Box categories and are considered the most trade-
distorting.1' Amber Box subsidies include price-support subsidies
tied to the current market price of a product or those "subsidies
directly related to production quantities."'3 5
Amber Box subsidies are subject to reduction commitments
imposed by the URAA, unless the subsidies qualify for exemption
under one of two criteria: de minimis limitations, or Total
Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)'36 commitments.'
Amber Box subsidies are limited to 5% of agricultural production
for developed countries'. and 10% for developing countries.'3 9
These subsidies are not limited for the least developed countries.
In addition, WTO members are required to reduce the use of these
128 Compare discussion supra Part IIA, with Part II.B.
129 See, e.g., WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 83 (explaining the categories of subsidies
under the Agreement on Agriculture).
130 See id at art. 6(4).
131 See id. at art. 6(5).
132 See id at Annex 2.
133 See WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 83.
134 See id
135 Id
136 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at art. 1(h) (.'Total AMS'
mean[s] the sum of all domestic support provided in favour of agricultural producers,
calculated as the sum of all aggregate measurements of support for basic agricultural
products, all non-product-specific aggregate measurements of support and all equivalent
measurements of support for agricultural products. . .
137 See id
138 See id. at arts. 6(3)-6(4)(a).
139 See id. at arts. 6(3)-6(4)(b).
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subsidies. For developed countries, the obligation is to reduce
their annual domestic support of AMS (based on 1986-88
levels)140 by 20% over a six-year implementation period,14 1
beginning in 1995.142 Developing countries agreed to a 13%
reduction in AMS over a ten-year period and least-developed
countries were exempt from support reduction commitments. 14 3
Therefore, for all WTO members, support measures that exceed
the de minimis limits or commitment for the relevant year would
not be in compliance and would be subject to challenge.
b. Blue Box Subsidies
Blue Box subsidies, also referred to as "[A]mber [B]ox with
conditions," 4 4 are subsidies subject to "conditions designed to
reduce distortion." 4 5  Subsidies that normally would be in the
Amber Box are placed in the Blue Box if the support also requires
farmers to limit production.146  For example, to qualify direct
payments as Blue Box subsidies, the payments must be based "on
fixed area and yields; or. . . made on 85% or less of the base level
of production; or ... [for] livestock payments ... made on a fixed
number of head." 47 Blue Box subsidies are viewed as less trade-
distorting than Amber Box subsidies as they limit rather than
encourage production, 148 and are therefore less likely to cause
price-suppressive effects.149 Under the URAA, Blue Box subsidies
are not subject to any support reduction commitments.150
140 See id. at Annex 3 T 11.
141 See Michael J. Shumaker, Comment, Tearing the Fabric of the World Trade
Organization: United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 32 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 547, 562-63 (2007).
142 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at art. 1(f).
143 See id at arts. 15-16; Shumaker, supra note 141, at 561.
144 WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 83.
145 Id
146 See id
147 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at art. 6(5)(a).
148 See WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 83.
149 See discussion supra Part I.A.
150 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at art. 6.5; WTO Fact Sheet,
supra note 83.
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c. Green Box Subsidies
Green Box subsidies have "no, or at most minimal, trade-
distorting effects or effects on production.""' To qualify, such
subsidies must meet certain policy-specific criteria,152 be provided
through a "publicly-funded government programme . . . not
involving transfers from consumers,"' and "not have the effect of
providing price support to producers." 54 Examples of Green Box
subsidies contained in Annex 2 of the Agreement are: (a) general
services, such as research, pest and disease control, and
"infrastructural services, including[] electricity reticulation, roads
and other means of transport, market and port facilities, and water
supply facilities;"' 5 (b) public stockholding for food security
purposes;' 56 (c) domestic food aid;' (d) certain "[d]irect payments
to producers;"' (e) "[d]ecoupled income support;""' (f) "income
insurance and income safety-net programmes;" 160 (g) natural
disaster relief;16 1 (h) "producer retirement programmes;"162 (i)
" resource retirement programmes;"6  (j) "investment aids;"" (k)
151 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, Annex 2(1).
152 See id. at Annex 2(2)-(13).
153 Id. 1(a).
154 Id. T l(b).
155 Expenditures that qualify as "general services," must be "directed to the
provision or construction of capital works only, and shall exclude the subsidized
provision of on-farm facilities other than for the reticulation of generally available public
utilities. [Expenditures] shall not include subsidies to inputs or operating costs, or
preferential user charges." Id. 2(g).
156 Under the SCM, "[flood purchases by the government shall be made at current
market prices and sales from food security stocks shall be made at no less than the
current domestic market price for the product and quality in question." Id. 13.
157 However, eligibility to receive domestic food aid must be "subject to clearly-
defined criteria related to nutritional objectives ... [and] be in the form of direct
provision of food to those concerned or the provision of means to allow eligible
recipients to buy food either at market or at subsidized prices." Agreement on
Agriculture, supra note 70, Annex 2 4.
158 Id. T 5.
159 Id. 6.
160 Id 7.
161 See id. T 8.
162 Id. 9.
163 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, Annex 2 10.
164 Id. 11.
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"environmental programmes;"l6 5 and (1) "regional assistance
programmes."l66
Green Box subsidies are not subject to any caps or limits.167
For this reason, the Green Box has become an attractive category
for subsidizing countries that seek to structure their support
programs to be immune from challenge under the URAA as
described below.
C. Limitations in the WTO Framework
1. Amber Box
The de minimis exception of five percent from Amber Box
subsidies for developed countries1 68 has been criticized as
unnecessary or excessive, and critics argue it should either be
eliminated or significantly reduced. 169  Exempting support
measures that do not exceed five percent of the country's total
agricultural production can have a significant trade-distorting
effect, especially where the national agricultural production is
huge and support measures are mostly concentrated in a few
agricultural products.o7 0  Because the de minimis rules focus on
total production and do not place limits of support per product
based on levels of production of particular products, the United
States, for example, with an estimated total agricultural production
valued at $200 billion, can subsidize a sector such as cotton by any
amount not exceeding $10 billion and not breach its support
reduction commitment."' Proposals for reform of Amber Box
subsidies have centered on "how much further these subsidies
should be reduced, and whether limits should be set for specific




167 See WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 83.
168 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at arts. 6(3)-(4).
169 See LouIs GOREUX, PREJUDICE CAUSED BY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
SUBSIDIES TO COTTON SECTORS IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA 16 (2d ed. 2004).
170 See discussion supra Part I.A.
171 See GOREUX, supra note 169, at 16.
172 WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 83.
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2. Green Box
Criticisms have been leveled against some Green Box
subsidies on the grounds that they do not meet the requisite
criteria, and "the trade distortion they cause might be more than
minimal" due to the large sums paid or the nature of the
subsidies.17 3  The subsidies targeted by the complaints include
direct payments to farmers," such as decoupled income support17 5
and government financial support for income and insurance safety-
net programs,176 and structural assistance through investment
aid.177
Most concerns about the abuse of Green Box subsidies have
focused on the effects of decoupled income support and
investment aid within the Green Box.77 Decoupled income
support in the European Union aims to account for 25 billione,
while investment aid ("support given to farmers to modernize their
farms, either in the form of a direct payment, or by subsidizing
interest payments") is about 5 billionE.17 9 Investment aid could
lead to overproduction as it both reduces current expenses and
costs of production when money is used to buy more modern and
more efficient equipment. To minimize this effect, the WTO rules
require that investment assistance be strictly limited to structurally
disadvantaged farms and that only the amount necessary to
remedy that disadvantage be given, according to clear and
transparent criteria. so However, the EU regulation on investment
assistance omits reference to disadvantaged farms, requiring only
that applicants prove they can be commercially successful.'
While decoupled aid is an improvement from previous subsidy
173 Id.
174 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, Annex 2 5.
I75 See id. 6.
176 See id. 7.
'77 See id. 11.
178 See, e.g., OXFAM INTERNATIONAL et al., GREEN BUT NOT CLEAN, WHY A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF GREEN Box SUBSIDIES IS NECESSARY 2-3 (2005), available
at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/green.pdf [hereinafter OXFAM,
GREEN BUT NOT CLEAN].
179 Id. at 3.
180 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, Annex 2 T 11.
181 See OXFAM, GREEN BUT NOT CLEAN, supra note 178, at 4.
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programs,182 the framework for decoupled aid contains loopholes
that distort trade and can lead to dumping.' These loopholes are
principally found in implementation regulations, which consist of
updating requirements,' 8 4 planting restrictions, 185 and obligations
to maintain land in suitable agricultural condition.' The
concentration of payments' and the availability of both coupled
and decoupled income programs to beneficiaries tend to amplify
182 See Tim Rice, 5 Reasons Why a Comprehensive Review of Green Box Subsidies
is Required Within the WTO, at 1-2, ACTION AID INTERNATIONAL, (2004),
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doclib/greenbox review.pdf (explaining a decoupling-
proponent's argument, which reasons that because decoupling breaks the link between
subsidy and production, it removes the farmer's incentive to maximize production,
which "effectively free[s] farmers to produce what the market and consumers want rather
than what the subsidy regimes dictate").
183 See, e.g., OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, MAKING TRADE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT IN
2005: WHAT THE EU SHOULD Do 5 (2005), available at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/tradeeu.pdf.
184 See OXFAM, GREEN BUT NOT CLEAN, supra note 178, at 5 (explaining that
"farmers know[, with updating requirements,] that reference years on decoupled
payments may be changed with time... and this may provide them with incentives to
keep production levels high"). Such an incentive might be motivated by the hope that
the increased production levels would become the basis for decoupled payments in future
reference years.
185 See Upland Cotton, supra note 60, at 105 (explaining Brazil's main argument,
which reasons that the legislation in the U.S. and EU, restricting planting based on
acreage, yields countries funneling production towards crops that are eligible for
support). Significantly, the WTO panel in the Upland Cotton case has ruled that planting
restrictions rendered the support payments impermissible Green Box subsidies. See id.
at 118.
186 See OXFAM, GREEN BUT NOT CLEAN, supra note 178, at 4 ("The standards that
have to be met to satisfy these requirements entail little more than adhering to already
compulsory environmental and animal welfare legislation. In other words, provided they
are not breaking the law already, farmers can meet the standards without having to
change any of their practices. On the other hand, if they decide to produce nothing on
that land, they are required to keep it open and prevent both erosion and coverage by
trees and shrubs. To ensure this, they have to either shred or mow everything that grows
on the land at least once a year. This means it is more remunerative for farmers to
produce, even at a small loss, provided the loss is smaller than the costs of keeping the
fallow land in good condition.").
187 See id. at 6. Green Box subsidies, especially decoupled payments, are being
concentrated in relatively few producers. Id. As a result, the effect of support is
augmented, since it allows those select producers to realize economies of scale. Id. For
example, in the U.K., 2% of its farmers received 20% of its payments. Id. Realization
of such economies of scale can "lead to overproduction, and thus to dumping." Id
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the distorting effects of the support measures.'" In Upland
Cotton, the WTO panel found that direct payments of about $617
million provided to U.S. cotton farmers, which were reported as
Green Box payments, did not fall within the Green Box category
as such payments constituted trade-distorting domestic support.'8 9
3. Blue Box
Because Blue Box subsidies contain no limits on spending,
some WTO members advocate establishing caps or reduction
commitments, while others call for transferring these supports into
the Amber Box.1 90 Other countries prefer to retain the Blue Box as
is, viewing it as "a crucial means of moving away from distorting
[A]mber [B]ox subsidies without causing too much [financial]
hardship."l 9'
The United States' proposals to reform the Blue Box have
been attacked on the ground that they would, in effect, expand the
Blue Box and create substantial opportunities for trade
distortion.' While the Blue Box currently permits only subsidies
that have a "production-limiting" function, 93 the United States
promotes inclusion of subsidies "that do not require
production."' 94 For the United States, the apparent purpose of
188 See id (explaining that the preceding detrimental effects of certain Green Box
subsidies are magnified when coupled and decoupled support are provided
simultaneously, a situation termed "partial decoupling").
189 See OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, DUMPING: THE BEGINNING OF THE END?
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RULING IN THE BRAZIL/US COTToN DISPUTE 1 (2004), available at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/dumping.pdf.
190 See WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 83.
'9' Id.
192 See Briefing Note, Oxfam International, A Little Blue Lie: Harmful Subsidies
Need to be Reduced Not Redefined (July 21, 2005) [hereinafter Oxfam, A Little Blue
Lie], available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/blue_0.pdf ("[The
United States' proposal] would allow the USA to shield counter-cyclical payments from
cuts to trade-distorting subsidies ... [permitting the] Blue Box ... [to] serve as a safety-
valve against the pressure to reduce subsidies, and could make it possible to avoid any
subsidy reduction at all.").
193 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at art. 6.5.
194 Briefing Note, Oxfam International, Square Pegs in Round Holes: How the
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redefining the Blue Box is to permit the inclusion of counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs),'9 5 of which it had been required in the
Upland Cotton case to notify the WTO. 196 CCPs are subsidies that
are paid to producers as a safety net when commodity prices fall
below specific levels.'97
However, U.S. CCP programs"' have been criticized for
setting price targets so highl99 based on such unrealistic
projections20 0 that payments are perpetual, rather than cyclical.
Thus, they provide more than just a safety net and they may be
even more trade distorting than other forms of subsidy. For
example, the calculation of payments is based on current prices,
thereby maintaining linkages between market conditions and
subsidies. In addition, farmers are restricted from planting many
crops in order to receive CCPs-a requirement that undermines
the intended planting flexibility available with decoupled
195 Oxfam, A Little Blue Lie, supra note 192, at 3.
196 Andersen & Taylor, supra note 60, at 4. Though the United States never
officially notified the WTO about the nature of counter-cyclical payments since their
creation in 2002, the United States was expected to classify these payments as trade-
distorting in the Amber Box based on the findings of the recent WTO ruling in the
Brazil/U.S. cotton dispute. In the WTO case, the panel concluded that U.S. counter-
cyclical payments on cotton were trade distorting and had caused damage to other cotton
exporting countries by encouraging U.S. production and depressing world cotton prices.
See DANIEL A. SUMNER, U.S. FARM PROGRAMS AND AFRICAN COTTON 8 (2007). Creating
new criteria for the Blue Box would, in effect, allow the United States to shield counter-
cyclical payments from cuts to trade-distorting subsidies. For useful analyses of the
Brazil/USA cotton dispute, see William A. Gillon, The Panel Report on the US-Brazil
Cotton Dispute: WTO Subsidy Rules Confront US Agriculture, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 7,
29-30 (2005); Phoenix X.F. Cai, Think Big and Ignore the Law: US Corn and Ethanol
Subsidies and WTO Law, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 865, 886-98 (2009).
197 Oxfam, A Little Blue Lie, supra note 192, at 3.
198 For an overview of counter-cyclical programs, see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON.
RESEARCH SERV., Counter-cyclical Income Support Payments, June 25, 2003,
http://lobby.1a.psu.edu/_107th/123_Farm Bill/AgencyActivities/US Department-of A
griculture/USDA Counter Cyclical IncomePayments.htm [hereinafter ECON.
RESEARCH SERV., Counter-cyclical Income Support Payments].
199 For example, while counter-cyclical payments for wheat were targeted at $3.86
per bushel in 2002, the average wheat price for the previous 15 years had been $3.22 per
bushel. Market prices for wheat have not reached $3.86 for decades, except for two
exceptional years in the mid-1990s. Oxfam, A Little Blue Lie, supra note 192, at 3-4.
200 It appears the "[t]arget prices and the resulting counter-cyclical payments are set
by political bargaining, not by any discernible policy foundation." Id.
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payments.2 0 1 Furthermore, CCPs could distort agricultural
production by shielding producers from price signals, reducing
risk,202 and encouraging increased production.20 3
D. Stalemate in the WTO Support Reform Agenda
1. General Negotiations on Agriculture
The URAA was intended to be the first step in a series of
meaningful reforms of the agricultural support regime.
Accordingly, the preamble describes the Agreement as beginning
"a process of reform of trade agriculture" 204 initiated through "the
negotiation of commitments on support and protection"205 and
providing for "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural
support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time,
resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions
in world agricultural markets."2 06
Formal negotiations on agriculture began in early 2000 as
required under the URAA. 2 07  By November 2001, over 121
countries had submitted negotiating proposals. 208  The 2001
Ministerial Conference in Doha called for comprehensive
201 Id. at 5.
202 The impact of risk reduction relates not simply to the payments themselves, but
to the expectation that subsidies may expand in the future. As noted by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture in explaining the economic effects of counter-cyclical
payments, "economic efficiency in production is reduced because producers would not
be fully responding to signals from the marketplace, but instead would be responding to
market signals augmented by expected benefits of future programs and future program
changes." ECON. RESEARCH SERV., Counter-cyclical Income Support Payments, supra
note 198.
203 An empirical study found that counter-cyclical payments had larger production
impacts than other 'decoupled' payments. Oxfam, A Little Blue Lie, supra note 192, at
5.
204 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at pmbl.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 The URAA provided: "Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial
progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an
ongoing process, Members agree that negotiations for continuing the process will be
initiated one year before the end of the implementation period." Id. at art. 20. This
implementation period ended in 2001.
208 The Doha Declaration Explained, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (last visited
Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dda e/dohaexplained e.htm.
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negotiations to reduce, with a view to phasing out, all export
subsidies, and for substantial reductions for supports that distort
trade.20 9 The pillars of the agriculture negotiations were identified
as market access, domestic support and export subsidies. 210  No
progress was made at the next Ministerial Conference in Cancun
in 2003, where the talks broke down over differences in the
agenda for the conference. 2 11  However, a compromise was
worked out the following year by the General Council of the WTO
in a decision that has come to be known as the July Package,212
where the General Council laid down the framework for
establishing modalities in agriculture.2 13
Regarding domestic support, the General Council called for
the overall base of all trade-distorting domestic support to be
"reduced according to a tiered formula."2 14 De minimis reductions
were to be negotiated, taking into account the principle of special
and differential treatment, although developing countries that
allocated almost all their de minimis support for subsistence and
resource-poor farmers would be exempt.2 15 Specific guidelines
were provided on the review and reform of Blue Box 2 16 and Green
209 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 748 (2002).
210 Id.
211 The ministerial conference ended without consensus after chairperson Luis
Ernesto Derbez concluded that despite considerable movement in consultations,
members remained entrenched, particularly on the Singapore issues. Day 5: Conference
Ends Without Consensus, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Sept. 14, 2003),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min03_e/minO3 14sept-e.htm.
212 Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August
2004, WT/L/579 (2004) [hereinafter Doha Work Programme].
213 Id. at Annex 4.
214 Id. 7.
215 Id. 11.
216 The revised Blue Box criteria will permit WTO Members to make direct
payments either under production-limiting programs or programs that do not require
production. Direct payments qualify as being made under production-limiting programs
if they are "based on fixed and unchanging areas and yields," or are "made on 85% or
less of a fixed and unchanging base level of production," or are livestock payments
"made on a fixed and unchanging number of head." On the other hand, direct payments
do not require production if "such payments are based on fixed and unchanging bases
and yields; or [are] livestock payments made on a fixed and unchanging number of head;
and are made on 85% or less of a fixed and unchanging base level of production." Id.
13. Significantly, the General Council Decision also provided that the "Blue Box
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Box subsidies.217 On the subject of export subsidies, the General
Council agreed "to establish detailed modalities ensuring the
parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines
on all export measures with equivalent effect by a credible end
date."218
Subsequently, the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference set
2013 as the end date for eliminating all export subsidies, 219 stating
that this was to be "achieved in a progressive and parallel manner,
to be specified in the modalities, so that a substantial part is
realized by the end of the first half of the implementation
period." 2 20 However, the date for the elimination of all forms of
export subsidies, together with the agreed progressivity and
parallelism, would be subject to confirmation "only upon the
completion of the modalities."22 1
In July 2006, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy suspended
the Doha Round negotiations indefinitely after talks on modalities
for agricultural subsidy reductions and market access provisions
collapsed.222 In his address to the heads of the trade delegations,
Director-General Lamy noted that "the gap in level of ambition
between market access and domestic support remained too wide to
bridge." 223  The United States and the European Communities
support will not exceed 5% of a Member's average total value of agricultural production
during an historical period" to be established in the negotiations. Id. 15.
217 Green Box criteria were to be reviewed and clarified with a view to ensuring that
Green Box measures have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on
production. Such a review and clarification would ensure that the basic concepts,
principles, and effectiveness of the Green Box remained and took due account of non-
trade concerns. The revised framework would include "improved obligations for
monitoring and surveillance." Id. 16.
218 Id.117.
219 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 22 December 2005,
WT/MIN/05/DEC, 6 (2005) [hereinafter Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration].
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Talks Suspended, 'Today There Are Only Losers', WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (July 24, 2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news06_e/mod06_summary_24july e.htm; Alan
Beattie & Frances Williams, Dark Day for WTO After WTO Talks Collapse in Acrimony,
FIN. TIMEs (LONDON), July 25, 2006, at 1.
223 DG Lamy: Time Out to Review Options and Positions, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (July 27, 2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06 e/tnc dgstat 24july06_e.htm.
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preferred "broader reform packages that would enhance market
access, while developing countries, which constitute the majority
of the General Body, prefer[red] to focus on decreasing subsidies
provided to producers in developed countries, with little interest
beyond cotton and other sensitive crops." 2 24
No significant progress has been reported since the collapse of
the talks-the agriculture negotiations in the Doha Development
Agenda have practically ground to a halt, with no new agreement
in sight for the reduction of support measures. 2 25  At the most
recent Ministerial Conference in Geneva, in December, 2011, the
conference chairman bemoaned in his closing statement that
"despite full engagement and intensified efforts to conclude the
Doha Development Agenda single undertaking . . . the
negotiations [were] still at an impasse."2 26
2. The Cotton Initiative
In an attempt to mitigate losses to their export trade stemming
from distortions caused by support to cotton producers in other
countries, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali (the "Cotton
Four") submitted a joint proposal to the WTO on April 30,
2003.227 Under the proposal, they called for a "complete phase-out
of support measures for the production and export of cotton,",2 28
contending that the internal market reforms they had undertaken to
make their cotton sectors more globally competitive were virtually
nullified by market-distorting subsidies given by other WTO
members.2 29 Proponents of the Cotton Initiative argued that if
these domestic and export subsidies were eliminated, "cotton
production in [their] countries would be highly profitable and
224 Shumaker, supra note 141, at 595.
225 An overview of the current status of the Agriculture negotiations is available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/agric-e/negotie.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
226 See World Trade Organization, Chairman's Concluding Statement at the Eighth
Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(11)/11 (Dec. 15-17, 2011) [hereinafter Chairman's
Concluding Statement].
227 See generally World Trade Organization, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative
in Favour of Cotton: Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali,
TN/AG/GEN/4 (May 15, 2003) (outlining the Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso,
Chad, and Mali).
228 Id. T 6.
229 Id. TT 3, 15.
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could act as an important catalyst for poverty reduction in the
countries concerned." 2 30  The Cotton Initiative requested that
cotton growers in the least developed countries receive
compensation offsetting income lost as a result of cotton subsidies
until they were completely eliminated.2 3 1
The Cotton Initiative was presented to the 2003 WTO
Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico, with proposed
implementation modalities. 23 2 At the Conference, the Cotton Four
called for a relatively short period of three years, from 2004 to
2006, for the elimination of subsidies in "equal annual portions [to
ensure] a reduction by one-third per year of all the cotton support
measures." 23 3 They also proposed a transitional compensation
mechanism to be linked to the subsidy reduction period such that
"the longer the period, the greater the overall amount of
compensation to be paid."2 34
However, disagreement emerged at the Cancun Ministerial
Conference on whether to discuss the Cotton Initiative "as a
specific and separate issue or consider it under the three pillars of
the agriculture negotiations (market access, domestic support and
export subsidies)." 235 The WTO members also differed over "the
question of compensation, how it should be paid (for example
whether it should be development assistance) and who should
handle it." 2 36 As a result of the ministerial conference's collapse,
no action was taken on the Cotton Initiative at Cancun; thus, the
debate continued on how the discussion would fit into the Doha
230 Id. 4.
231 Id. 7.
232 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral
Initiative in Favour of Cotton, Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali,
WT/MIN(03)/W/2 (Aug. 15, 2003); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference,
Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, Joint Proposal by Benin,
Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, WT/MIN(03)/W/2/Add. I (Sept. 14, 2003).
233 World Trade Organization, Joint Proposal WT/MIN(03)/W/2, supra note 232, at
3.
234 World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Poverty
Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad and Mali, TN/AG/GEN/6, 10 (Aug. 4 2003).
235 Agriculture Negotiations: Backgrounder, The Cotton Initiative, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, (2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/agric-e/negs-bkgrnd20
cotton e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
236 Id. at 74.
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Development Agenda.2 37
The following year, the General Council of the WTO
announced a compromise that had been reached in relation to
regarding the Cotton Initiative. 23 8  As part of its July 2004
package, the General Council agreed that: (1) cotton would be
addressed "ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically" as part of
the Doha Round agriculture negotiations; 239 (2) a subcommittee on
cotton would be created to meet periodically with the WTO
Committee on Agriculture and ensure "appropriate prioritization
of the cotton issue independently from other sectoral
initiatives;" 240 and (3) the WTO Director General would work with
international organizations to direct additional resources towards
development of economies where cotton has vital importance.24 1
The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005
declared that all forms of export subsidies for cotton were to be
eliminated by developed countries in 2006.242 Furthermore, trade-
distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production were to be
"reduced more ambitiously than under whatever general formula is
agreed and that it should be implemented over a shorter period of
time than generally applicable."2 43 Thus, the reform of trade-
distorting cotton subsidies was to go farther and faster than
reforms on subsidies for other agricultural commodities.
To make the phrase "more ambitiously" more concrete, the
Cotton Four proposed a formula in March 2006 that called for
deeper subsidies cuts for cotton if reductions for other
commodities were modest 244 and a timetable for making such
reductions that are one-third the time for agriculture as a whole.245
237 Id.
238 Doha Work Programme, supra note 212, 1(b).
239 Id. at Annex A, 4.
240 Id.
241 Id. 1 1(b).
242 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 219, T 11.
243 Id.
244 The formula was designed so that the cut in Amber Box subsidies for cotton are
deeper than those for agriculture as a whole. See Members Mull New Details in 'Cotton
Four' Proposal, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Mar. 2, 2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06_e/cotton_2march06_e.htm.
245 The proposal called on WTO members to agree on a date by April 2006, before
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However, while some WTO members-including the EU, China,
and Australia-welcomed the new proposals, the United States
objected to a discussion of the issues until it knew what would
happen in the general agriculture negotiations.24 6 Since then, there
has been no further significant action taken at the WTO regarding
the cotton issue.2 47  At the end of the most recent Ministerial
Conference in Geneva in December 2011, the conference
chairman noted, in a non-binding text summarizing deliberations,
the commitment of trade ministers to "on-going dialogue and
engagement to progress the mandate ... of the Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration to address cotton 'ambitiously,
expeditiously[,] and specifically' within the agriculture
negotiations."2 48
IV. Subsidies and the Economic Partnership Agreement
Negotiations
A. Trade Liberalization Objective of the Economic
Partnership Agreement Negotiations
The current agreement governing trade relations between the
European Union and ACP countries is the Cotonou Agreement,
signed on June 23, 2000, which seeks to reduce poverty and
promote the sustainable development and gradual integration of
ACP countries into the world economy.24 9  The Cotonou
Agreement is comprised of three pillars of cooperation:
political,25 0 developmental,25 ' and economic and trade.252 Under
the economic and trade pillar, the EU and ACP countries agreed to
conclude new trading arrangements compatible with WTO
the end of the Doha Round for the elimination of all trade-distorting domestic supports.
Id.
246 Id.
247 An overview of the current status of the negotiations on cotton is available at
http://wto.org/english/tratop e/agric e/cottonsubcommittee-e.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2012).
248 See Chairman's Concluding Statement, supra note 226, at 2.
249 Cotonou Agreement, supra note 16, at art. 1.
250 Id. at Part 1(11).
251 Id. at Part 3(1).
252 Id. at Part 3(11).
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provisions called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).2 53
EPAs are expected to replace non-reciprocal trade preferences of
the earlier trading arrangements, which entails the progressive
removal of trade barriers between the ACP countries and the EU,
"leading ultimately to reciprocal trade liberalization."2 54
The negotiations were launched on schedule in Brussels on
July 5, 2002.255 At the opening ministerial conference, it was
decided that the negotiations would be conducted in two phases.25 6
The first phase of negotiations, which was concluded a year later,
was conducted between all-ACP countries and covered horizontal
issues of interest to all parties.2 57  The second phase of the
negotiations is being conducted at the group level.258 The groups
include West Africa, East and Southern Africa, the Southern
African Development Community, Central Africa, and the
Caribbean (CARIFORUM). 259
The Cotonou Agreement requires any new trade agreement
negotiated between the ACP countries and the European Union to
comply with WTO rules.260 To make the EU-ACP countries' trade
WTO compatible, the ACP countries and European Union decided
to restructure their preferential trading system to conform to WTO
rules on regional arrangements.26 1 In this regard, Article XXIV of
253 Id. at art. 37(1).
254 Dileepa Witharana et al., Rethinking the Link Between Trade and Development,
A Discussion Based on the Framework of the Proposed India Sri Lanka Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 13 (Sept. 2007) (Working Paper).
255 See ACP Guidelines for the Negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements,
ACP/61/056/02 (July 5, 2002), available at http://www.eusa.org.za/en/PDFdownload/




258 The issues tackled in the second phase include "tariff negotiations and any other
specific sectoral commitments at national or regional level as the case may be and issues
of specific interest to ACP countries or regions." Id.
259 See ACP Guidelines, supra note 255.
260 The Cotonou Agreement stipulated that the European Union and the ACP
countries would "conclude new World Trade Organization .. . compatible trading
arrangements, removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing
cooperation in all areas relevant to trade." Cotonou Agreement, supra note 16, at art. 3
1.
261 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh
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GATT allows for derogations from the WTO "most-favored
nation" obligation among preferential partners in regional trade
agreements under which all parties have agreed to liberalize
trade.262 Specifically, "duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce . . . [must be] eliminated with respect to substantially
all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at
least with respect to substantially all the trade in products
originating in such territories."263
The objectives of EPAs include establishing a free-trade area
among ACP countries regions and the European Union, enhancing
the competitiveness of ACP countries firms in ACP countries
markets, and improving access for ACP countries exports to the
EU market.2 64 In general, the term "free-trade area" denotes "a
group of two or more countries that have eliminated tariff and
most non-tariff barriers affecting trade among themselves, while
each country applies its own independent schedule of tariffs to
imports from countries that are not members ....
Accordingly, trade liberalization under the EPAs should not only
aim for the removal of tariffs, but also for the elimination of
significant non-tariff barriers. Significantly, in the Cotonou
Agreement, the European Union underscored its understanding
that "trade liberalization . .. shall aim at improving current market
access for the ACP countries." 26 6 Similarly, the ACP countries
considered the goals of the EPAs to be to "improve the market
access by . .. addressing export subsidies and domestic support,
for all agricultural products originating from ACP States."26 7
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. XXIV, Annex lA, 33 I.L.M.
1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
262 See id. at art. XXIV.
263 See id. at art. XXIV T 8.
264 See Economic Community of West African States, Meeting of Ministers of
Trade on the Economic Partnership Agreement Between West Africa and the European
Community: Road Map for Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations Between
West Africa and the European Community, 4 (Aug. 4, 2004),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/october/tradoc_118923.pdf (last visited Oct.
30, 2012).
265 See RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, 2009
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK §9 (10th ed. Supp. 2009).
266 Cotonou Agreement, supra note 16, at art. 37 7.
267 ACP Guidelines, supra note 255, T 35 (emphasis added).
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Given this consensus on the need for trade liberalization,
discussions on eliminating EU subsidies or establishing policies
mitigating the adverse effects of EU subsidies as part of a bid to
improve market access for ACP countries appear to fall clearly
within the scope of EPA negotiations.
B. Proposals on Subsidies
At the beginning of EPA negotiations, the European Union
submitted its draft text on the EPA with common terms on
subsidies to the various ACP regions.26 8 Under the EU proposals,
each party would agree not to "introduce any new subsidy
payment of which is contingent upon export or increase any
existing subsidy of this nature on products destined for the
territory of the other Party."269 If an ACP region would commit to
eliminate custom duties for a given product, the European Union
would undertake "to phase out all existing subsidies granted upon
the exportation of that product to the territory of the [ACP
region]" in accordance with modalities to be set out in an
Annex. 27 0 The EU proposal applied to all products covered in the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture.2 7 1
CARIFORUM concluded an EPA in 2008-the first ACP
region to do so. 27 2  Article 28 of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA
reflects an agreement on subsidies that closely resembles the EU
proposal, suggesting that the proposal was adopted without much
negotiation by the CARIFORUM negotiators. 273  However, in at
least one ACP country, subsidies have emerged as a key issue in
negotiations.2 74 For example, in early 2008, West Africa
268 See EC Working Document: Economic Partnership Agreement between the
West African States, ECOWAS and UEMOA, of the One Part, and the European
Community and its Member States, of the Other Part, art. 3, (April 4, 2007) [hereinafter
EC Working Document].
269 Id. at pt. 1I, ch. 3, art. 3 1.
270 Id. at pt. II, ch. 3, art. 3 2.
271 Id. at pt. II, ch. 3, art. 3 T 3.
272 See Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the
One Part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the Other Part, 2008
O.J. (L289), 15, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf.
273 See id.
274 See Draft Joint Text of the Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations
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submitted a counterproposal 275 calling for the elimination of all
subsidies and related internal support measures. Specifically, the
proposal provided:
The Parties . .. recognize that export subsidies and certain
internal support measures can create distortions in agricultural
products markets, and weaken policies implemented. The
[European Union] shall undertake therefore to . .. [eliminate the
impact of] .. . all subsidies and internal support on products
whose exportation will harm the regions' efforts to achieve
sustainable agricultural development and food security.27 6
The EU negotiators objected to comprehensive discussions on
subsidies in the context of the EU-West Africa EPA negotiations,
contending that the WTO was the more appropriate forum for such
negotiations.2 77 They expressed their reluctance to make
commitments in an EPA that exceeded the EU's obligations to the
WTO.2 78 Moreover, given the political sensitivity of CAP, they
advised it was unlikely that the EU would endorse an EPA
requiring the termination of such a policy. 279  However, West
Africa countered by pointing out that reliance on the WTO to
develop the relevant framework to govern subsidy matters arising
under EPAs was not realistic given the stalemate that had
developed in the WTO negotiations on subsidies.280 It was equally
untenable to the West African region that continuing harms to its
trade with the European Union due to EU subsidies could be
expected to go without remedy, pending resolution of the subsidy
question at the WTO.2 8 1
Despite some modest advances in the EU-West Africa EPA
negotiations, such as a provision for consultations on subsidy
between West Africa and the European Union, Article 3 on Cooperation in the Areas of
Agriculture and Food Security, of Chapter 6 on Agriculture, Fishing and Food Security
(on file with author) [hereinafter Draft Joint Text].
275 See id.
276 Id. at 20.
277 The description that follows in this section of developments about the EPA
negotiations is based largely on personal knowledge of the author who was a member of
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matters, negotiations stalled in September 20 10.282 That month,
the European Union withdrew all previous proposals and
substituted a new text billed as a fresh proposal to advance the
negotiations.2 83 On closer examination, however, this proposal did
not differ much from the one the European Union had circulated at
the start of the negotiations. Like the original proposal, the
September 2010 offer focused narrowly on export subsidies and
did not tackle the broader question of EU domestic subsidies or
other internal support mechanisms that affect the competitiveness
of West African products.2 84 It also included the condition that
West Africa reciprocate by eliminating its tariffs on categories of
products that are eligible for EU export subsidies.28 5 Such a
condition proved problematic for two main reasons: first, the
condition was misplaced since there was already an international
obligation imposed on WTO members under the Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration to eliminate all export subsidies by
282 See Economic Partnership Agreements EU-ACP: Facts and Key Issues, OFF.
FOR PROMOTION OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, 46-47 (Spring 2012),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfloppd/Page_8/EPAsSpring20l2final.pdf
283 The September 2010 text reads:
1. Neither party can introduce a new export subsidy nor increase existing
subsidies of such nature on all products destined for the territory of the other
party.
2. Regarding all products or group of products such as defined in paragraph 3
for which the West African party has undertaken to eliminate tariffs, the
European Union party will dismantle all export subsidies related to such
products or group of products destined for the West African region. The
modalities for progressive elimination will be determined by the Joint
Committee for the Implementation of the EPA.
3.This article applies to products covered by Annex I of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture. The term group of products comprises all products, including
processed goods, benefiting from export subsidies with regards to the base
products.
4.The present article is without prejudice to the application by the West African
Party of Article 9, paragraph 4, of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and
Article 27 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
Notes of the author as a participant in the EU-West Africa Economic Partnership
Agreement Negotiations, Sept. 14-16, 2010, at the headquarters of the European
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2013;286 and second, some of the affected products are sensitive
products for West Africa that have been placed in the category of
goods not subject to liberalization by West Africa.28 7
In response, West Africa submitted a counter-proposal that
would subject issues regarding subsidies to the full scope of the
dispute prevention and settlement mechanisms of the EPA.288 The
proposal provided that:
With respect to other measures of support, including domestic
support mechanisms and without prejudice to Articles 21, 22,
and 47, the parties may proceed in accordance with the
provisions of Part V on dispute avoidance and settlement of this
agreement to seek to resolve concerns that either party may raise
regarding the support measures of the other party. 289
As of the time of writing, the parties have yet to agree on a
compromise text on the issue of subsidies.
V. The Way Forward in EPA Negotiations
A. Interim Solutions
1. Increased Transparency
The defects of the WTO regime noted earlier in the article290
could be remedied most effectively by eliminating or reducing the
de minimis exception applicable to the Amber Box category, and
tightening the provisions on decoupled income, investment aid,
and other types of support susceptible to abuse in the Green and
Blue Boxes. However, given the stall in the WTO agriculture
talks, such a solution may not be available in the very near future.
In the face of the European Union's continued objections to
concessions in EPA negotiations, it seems unlikely that the
European Union would make commitments in an EPA that could
be construed as new or different from its existing WTO
obligations.
Under these circumstances, the preferred approach would be to
286 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 219.
287 See id.
288 Author Notes on EU-West Africa EPA, supra note 283.
289 Id.
290 See supra notes 155-188 and accompanying text.
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retain the current international rules as the basic framework for
EPAs while insisting on greater transparency regarding the
application of those rules by the European Union as they affect its
trade with ACP countries. Transparency requirements would
support measures, benefitting either product categories that feature
prominently in current trade between ACP regions and the
European Union, or that the region has potential capacity to supply
to the EU market. To this end, EPAs need mechanisms for an
assessment of whether the criteria of trade-distorting measures29 1
under the WTO framework are being met by all EU subsidies in
the Green Box relevant to its trade with a particular ACP region.
In this regard, a Joint Subsidy Committee could be established
under EPAs to investigate and address concerns about trade-
distorting domestic, support and to provide a forum for regular
discussions on whether aspects of support are, in turn, trade-
distorting.
To facilitate effective monitoring of EU support measures, the
European Union should be required to provide to such a Joint
Subsidy Committee more detailed information about domestic
support relevant to trade with the ACP countries region than is
publicly available in EU notifications to the WTO. The
information should include: (a) the specific amounts allocated as
support, (b) to which enterprises and groups, and (c) over what
period. The European Union should also be required to provide
information on the average cost of production and export prices of
commodities produced on lands benefitting from this type of
support. Such information could be used to support challenges to
exports as dumping where the costs of production exceed export
prices.
2. Securing the Necessary Policy Space
As one observer noted:
The "problem in the ... EPA negotiations between EU and
the ... ACP countries is that the latter do not have the financial
means to provide support for their farmers. Yet, the key policy
tools ACP countries do use to support their farmers-tariffs,
export taxes, quantitative restrictions-are largely being targeted
for removal in the EPAs, creating a major imbalance in the
291 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at Annex 2 1.
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negotiations, as well as in the agricultural trade landscape
between EU and the ACP.292
The case for taking domestic supports provided by the EU to
European farmers into account in the EPA negotiations and to
provide for ACP countries policy space has been stated quite
succinctly:
Large amounts of financial supports have the same impact as the
EU availing of permanent safeguards since these financial
supports protect European producers from the commercial
consequences [sic] of competition from imports. [sic]
Additionally, they also have the impact of making EU exports
artificially competitive, hence taking over ACP markets and
squeezing ACP local farmers out of their own markets. ACP
countries should be able to take the necessary policy measures to
shield themselves from EU's domestic supports, and also have
additional policy space, rather than less policy space to manage
their own agricultural sectors, as compared to the EU.293
One method of securing policy space would be to exempt
categories of products, for which the European Union provides
agricultural support, from liberalization by ACP countries.
Significantly, the European Union has conditioned its offer to
remove export subsidies in certain sectors on the ACP regions'
liberalization of trade in those sectors.2 9 4 In effect, if not in
language, the European Union has acknowledged and sought to
minimize the trade-distorting effects of CAP by offering to
remove support extended to EU exports to overseas markets.
However, the European Union offer provides only a partial
remedy by proposing a solution limited to the loss of
competitiveness of ACP producers in their home markets, as it
fails to address the lack of competitiveness of ACP products
exported to the EU market. For ACP products that could be more
competitive in EU markets, but for the existence of domestic
support to competing EU products, it would be necessary to
eliminate the distortion in trade by removing domestic support as
well. If the European Union is not willing to withdraw domestic
support then, to level the playing field, ACP countries should
292 GDC-Partners, supra note 7, at 1.
293 Id. at 1-2.
294 See EC Working Document, supra note 268, at pt. II, ch. 3, art. 3, 1-3.
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retain the ability to apply tariffs on categories of EU exports that
benefit from EU domestic support (and compete with ACP
products in EU markets) to offset the market access restrictions.
In this regard, the tariffs should apply to EU exports whether or
not they were also given export subsidies.
Incidentally, the continued domestic support in the EU market
for EU products that compete with ACP counterparts raises
serious questions about the European Union's offer to fully open
its markets under the EPAs.29 5 Given the barriers to trade
associated with the EU CAP, it is wrong to assume that there
would indeed be full access to the EU market while CAP is
maintained, lending further support to the need for a tariff-based
solution to the CAP's trade restrictions.
In the EU-West Africa EPA negotiations, the European Union
has argued that current border measures should be a sufficient
safeguard against the adverse effects of EU subsidies.29 6 For
example, it pointed out that placing wheat and groat in the
exclusion categories of West Africa's liberalization schedule
amounts to placing a five percent tariff on imports of those
products after the EPA.297  However, because the exclusion list
affects just a few of the EU products benefitting from CAP, the
argument is flawed to the extent the border measures would not
apply to all imports from the EU benefitting from CAP. Besides,
some of the border measures are temporary, and would expire
based on a schedule established in the EPA.29 8 Moreover, in many
cases, the tariffs that would be applied would be relatively
295 Regarding market access commitments under free trade agreements that are
WTO compatible, the EU interprets Article XXIV of the GATT provision on reciprocal
trade arrangements to require liberalization of at least 90% of the total value of trade
between the EU and ACP. Thus, if the EU were to liberalize 100% of its trade as it has
offered to do in the EPAs, the ACP regions would have to liberalize 80% of their trade
and would therefore be able to protect only 20% of their trade with the EU. See Mayur
Patel, Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and African Countries:
Potential Development Implications for Ghana, 6 (2007),
http://www.realizingrights.org/pdf/EPAsbetweenthe EU-andAfrican Countries_-
DevelopmentImplications for Ghana.pdf.
296 Author Notes on EU-West Africa EPA, supra note 283.
297 Id.
298 To meet the WTO requirement of a progressive liberalization of trade by
members of a free trade area, the final EPA should provide for a gradual phasing out of
tariffs within a period of time to be agreed upon by the EU and West Africa.
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insignificant when compared to the huge amounts of EU support
and cannot offset the trade-distorting effects of EU support.299
Border measures would be effective only if they were permanent,
applied to all EU exports to West Africa benefitting from EU
support, and corresponded to the value of benefits gained from
CAP.
The European Union has also suggested using the food and
security clause of the proposed EPA to mitigate the adverse effects
of subsidies. Article 2 of the draft EU-West Africa EPA provides
in relevant part:
When implementing this Agreement causes or threatens to cause
difficulties in the availability of or access to the food products
necessary to ensure food security, and when such a situation
causes or risks causing serious difficulties for the West African
Party or a State of the WA region, the WA Party or the West
African State can take appropriate measures. 300
While the food and security safeguard clause would be useful
in situations where exports of goods from West Africa create
scarcities for domestic consumers, the provision cannot be applied
to resolve harms caused by the influx of cheap products from
Europe that drive out or threaten to drive out local producers.30 1
Therefore, it is irrelevant in addressing a major problem caused by
subsidies: diminishing competitiveness of local producers.
Neither would recourse to infant industry safeguards, as
advocated by the EU, be effective. The current draft EPA
authorizes safeguard measures including the suspension or
reduction of custom duties, increase in custom duty, or tariff
quotas302 to be adopted in response to imports "in such quantities
and in such conditions as may cause or threaten to cause
disturbances to an emerging industry producing similar or directly
competitive goods."30 3 However, this infant safeguard clause is
limited as it is applicable for only ten years from the date of the
299 If one assumes that it costs $100 to produce a commodity in the EU, which is
then dumped in the West African market for $60, facilitated by a subsidy of $50, then
assessing a 5% tariff on the declared value of the product, which will likely be less than
the cost of production, cannot offset the value of the subsidy.
300 Author Notes on EU-West Africa EPA, supra note 283.
301 See OXFAM, WHITE GOLD, supra note 54, at 11-13.
302 Author Notes on EU-West Africa EPA, supra note 283.
303 Id.
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agreement;304 any safeguard measures taken under the clause
cannot be in place for more than four years; 30" and further, no new
measures can be applied to a product unless a period of at least
one year had passed since the expiration of the last measure for
that product.306
3. Transitional Compensation
The European Union has acknowledged that aspects of its
CAP policy have adverse consequences on trade with ACP
countries.3 07 Yet it has been reluctant to commit to mitigation in
the context of its current WTO obligations.0 However, the status
quo is equally unacceptable and reasonable measures must be
adopted to address continuing harms caused by CAP, including
provision of transitional compensation. The case for
compensation is supported by a well-known principle of
international law articulated by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Chorzow Factory case, which states:
"[A]ny breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation." 309 As the court emphasized, "reparation must, as far
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed." 3 10 In this context,
compensation should not be considered as an incentive designed to
stimulate production, as compensation would be assessed mainly




307 See Interview by The Technical Centre for Agric. and Rural Cooperation with
Patrick Gomes, Guyana's Ambassador to the European Union, 1 (December 2010),
http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/Interview%20with%20Ambassador/20Gomes.pdf
308 See Dan Lui & Sanoussi Bilal, Contentious Issues in the Interim EPAs:
Potential Flexibility in the Negotiations, EUR. CTR. FOR DEV. POLICY MGMT., 9-13
(Discussion Paper No. 89, March 2009), http://www.ecdpm.org/WebECDPM/
Web/Content/Download.nsf/O/CAO600DFC1F8D539C125757C00491727/$FILE/09-89-
e_content issues%20EPAsdef.pdf.
309 The Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. 13, at 29 (Sept.
13).
310 Id. at 47.
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temporary retaliatory schemes available under the WTO.311
The amount of compensation could be set based on the
estimated loss of income to ACP producers arising from their
inability to export to the EU market or to compete in the domestic
market due to the trade distorting effects of CAP policy. Thus, in
sectors like the cotton industry in West and Central Africa where
subsidies from developed countries have had such a devastating
impact,3 12 claims for transitional compensation would be well-
founded. Compensation could be paid to national governments
and allocated according to priorities set by the governments to
reduce poverty. Where there are concerns that such forms of
compensation may not benefit the producers, funds could be
channeled through structures that already exist,3 13 such as
coalitions of producer groups in which the producers are well-
represented.3 14
B. Securing EU Commitment to CAP and WTO Support
Reforms
It would be useful to include a general commitment by the
European Union to continue CAP reforms and to work in support
of the subsidy reform measures discussed at the WTO in the EPA,
either as part of the text or in an annexed declaration. Although a
declaration would not be legally binding, it would serve to clarify
the European Union's goals in international negotiations and
affirm its resolve to tackle the subject of subsidies to ensure that
its CAP policy does not go against the EPA's development
objectives. Specific measures include support for: (a) eliminating
or significantly reducing the five percent de minimis exception or
limiting it to production of particular products rather than total
production; (b) closing trade-distorting loopholes in the Green Box
category;315 (c) providing transitional compensation for harm in
311 See GOREUX, supra note 169, at 8.
312 See OXFAM, FINDING MORAL FIBER, supra note 42, at 8-9.
313 See OXFAM, WHITE GOLD, supra note 54, at 14.
314 As observed, "[i]n Burkina Faso, the allocation of compensation could be
determined by the 'Comit de gestion de la filiere' (managing board) where producers
hold a majority of the seats and compensations to producers could be delivered free of
cost in the same way as the bonus is delivered today." GOREux, supra note 169, at 8.
315 Remedial measures include granting payments to family farming and imposing
strict ceilings on the amount that an individual farm can receive in order to avoid
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obvious cases, such as cotton subsidies; (d) establishing financial
and technical assistance for short term needs created by domestic
support policies of developed countries; (e) jump starting and fast
tracking talks on cotton subsidy reform;"' and (f) introducing a
"development box" in the URAA, thereby providing developing-
country governments the flexibility to protect their farmers from
dumping."'
VI. Conclusion
This article has identified overproduction as one category of
trade-distorting effects resulting from subsidies. Overproduction
leads to a surplus that is then directed at external markets with a
potentially dampening impact on global prices. The influx of
cheap subsidized imports in non-subsidizing developing country
markets adversely affects the competitiveness of local farmers
who are then forced to cut back production or close down
altogether. Viable domestic farmers will have difficulties
accessing the markets of subsidizing countries because their higher
priced products cannot compete against subsidized goods.
Furthermore, developing country governments will suffer a
decline in revenues and, thus, lose the ability to carry out
necessary social and economic programs to alleviate poverty as a
result of budgetary constraints.
The WTO has responded to these trade-distorting effects by
adopting two agreements that essentially prohibit export subsidies
and distinguish between actionable and non-actionable domestic
subsidies.31 8 Under the URAA, Amber Box subsidies are
economies of scale; eliminating so-called partial decoupling programs; disciplining the
accumulation of payments so that products that benefit from a specified amount of trade
distorting support under either the Amber or Blue Boxes should not be produced on land
that benefits from, for example, decoupled income support and investment aids, and
ensuring that base periods are fixed, unchanging, and notified.
316 This will build on a two-part strategy unveiled on February 12, 2004 by the EU
Commission for an EU-Africa partnership in support of the cotton sector: "general
endorsement of the West African initiative to seek a reduction of trade-distorting
subsidies in cotton; and trade-related technical assistance and support for African cotton-
producing countries in their efforts to consolidate the competitiveness of their cotton
sector." OXFAM, WHTE GOLD, supra note 54, at 9.
317 See id.
318 See supra notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
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prohibited subject to certain limits3 19 while Blue Box subsidies,
being transitional in nature, are permitted, subject to restrictions
regarding production.320 On the other hand, Green Box subsidies
that meet certain requirements are allowed as minimally or non-
trade-distorting.321
The WTO envisaged progressive reductions in the amounts of
domestic support permitted under the agreements adopted in
1994.322 However, it has not been possible to reform these
domestic support measures due to differences among WTO
members. The refusal of the European Union to discuss the issue
of subsidies outside the WTO forum has made it impossible to
explore meaningful and comprehensive reforms pertaining to
subsidies in the context of EPAs. Notwithstanding, this article has
proposed interim solutions: increased transparency by the
European Union in the application of WTO rules, preservation of
adequate policy space to respond to the adverse effects of
subsidies, and the provision of transitional compensation for loss
of income by ACP governments affected by the CAP.
319 See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
320 See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
321 See supra notes 138-171 and accompanying text.
322 See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 70, at art. 20.
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